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Abstract
This paper develops a framework for the analysis of gatekeeping in tax
enforcement, whereby independent auditors are assigned the duty of certifying
taxpayers’ reports. The equilibrium of the market for gatekeepers’ services is
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discusses the optimal structure of the gatekeeping regime and determines the
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21 Introduction
In many enforcement settings, collateral liability is imposed on third parties who
are not the primary authors of the misconduct, nor the direct beneﬂciaries, but may
nevertheless play an important part in preventing it. Using the terminology of Kraak-
man (1986), we call \gatekeeper liability," the liability imposed on third parties who
are entrusted with the duty to \disrupt misconduct by withholding their cooperation
from wrongdoers." Gatekeepers’ liabilities are extremely widespread and range from
that imposed on intermediaries who certify production standards or product quality
(e.g. compliance certiﬂcation with respect to ISO, IMQ, environmental regulations,
etc.), to the liability imposed on accountants and lawyers in securities transactions
with regard to their opinions (SEC regulations), and include the liability imposed on
employers with regard to the violations of their employees, and the liability of doctors
and pharmacists in preventing drug abuse.
The aim of this paper is to examine whether the introduction of a secondary
control system can provide a solution to the di–culties met by many public agencies
in the enforcement of tax law. In particular, we will analyze the properties of a
gatekeeping system in which taxpayers who claim not to be liable need to have their
tax return certiﬂed by an independent auditor. Auditors, in turn, are proﬂt-motivated
agents and compete on the audit market. The use of such an enforcement device raises
important issues, which we will address in the paper, such as: How is taxpayers’
behavior aﬁected by the certiﬂcation system? When is a gatekeeping system likely
to be superior to the simple alternative of direct public enforcement? What is the
optimal structure of the gatekeeper liability? Is a gatekeeping system vulnerable to
collusive behavior by the agents?
The general theme of collateral liability has attracted the attention of legal scholars
for a long time.1 In his fundamental work, Kraakman (1986) provides an extensive
analysis of the purposes served by collateral liability in the enforcement of law, and
presents an informal discussion of its beneﬂts and costs. The author comes to the
natural conclusion that the desirability of gatekeeping essentially depends on the
context of its application. In particular, he suggests that: \Successful gatekeeping is
likely to require (1) serious misconduct that practicable penalties cannot deter; (2)
missing or inadequate private gatekeeping incentives; (3) gatekeepers who can and
1Recent economically-oriented contributions in the law literature include Sykes (1981), (1984)
and (1988), and Kraakman (1984) and (1986).
3will prevent misconduct reliably; and (4) gatekeepers whom legal rules can induce to
detect misconduct at reasonable cost".
This paper extends Kraakman’s analysis by providing a precise content to the pre-
vious statement and by investigating other important issues relating to a gatekeeping
system, such as those associated with the properties of the equilibrium of the market
for gatekeeping services and the desirability of further delegation of the enforcement
functions. Although the focus will be on the enforcement of tax legislation, the in-
sights provided apply to a vast gamut of regulatory problems, in which enforcement
can involve both public and private actors.
We model the enforcement problem as one in which individuals who share some
predetermined characteristics are subject to a ﬂxed tax. The relevant characteristics
are private information to individuals and can be observed only through a costly
audit. Random audits are preformed by a public enforcement agency, which however
lacks the capacity to induce full compliance on the part of taxpayers. The state then
faces the option of using private auditors as gatekeepers, and imposing mandatory
auditing on taxpayers who want to be exempted for the tax. This requires a speciﬂc
collateral liability to be imposed on auditors, in order for them to be motivated to
detect illegitimate claims.
The paper characterizes the optimal behavior of taxpayers and private auditors
in the gatekeepers’ regime, assuming that the latter compete ￿ a la Bertrand on the
audit market.2 As expected, the introduction of a gatekeepers’ regime turns out to be
desirable only if certain conditions are satisﬂed. In particular, gatekeeping is proved
to increase social welfare only if: i) the collateral liability of private auditors is su–-
ciently large, or ii) the private audit cost is su–ciently small. In other words, private
gatekeeping represents an eﬁective enforcement tool only when gatekeepers can be
su–ciently motivated (high liability) or when they enjoy signiﬂcant informational ad-
vantages (low audit cost). Upon closer scrutiny, however, it is the second factor that
turns out to play the major role: we show that even if gatekeeper liability is stretched
to inﬂnity, gatekeeping is desirable only if the private audit cost is su–ciently small.
Despite its pervasiveness in legal institutions, gatekeeping has been surprisingly
neglected by the economic literature on optimal law enforcement. Since the publica-
tion of the in￿uential article by Becker and Stigler (1974), the issue of third party
2The assumption that the relation between taxpayers and auditors is mediated by the market
prevents the use of the mechanism design techniques, and forces a more \speculative" approach to
model building. Auditing models based on the revelation principle (focusing on issues diﬁerent from
those addressed by this paper) can be found in Baiman, Evans and Noel (1987) and Strausz (1995).
4enforcement has mainly gravitated around whether private enforcers would outper-
form public ones.3 Privatization, however, represents an extreme case of third party
involvement, in which the power to detect and sanction wrongdoers is completely
delegated to the private sector. Still, the results of this strand of literature are il-
luminating. Polinsky (1980) compares private enforcement with public enforcement
in a model in which individuals can engage in harmful activities. He comes to the
conclusion that any enforcement method may be socially preferable, depending on
the costs of each method as well as the level of harm associated with wrongdoing. His
main point is that, even though public enforcement may involve greater costs, it may
still be desirable, as it is not subject to the proﬂt constraint, and can hence result
in strong deterrence programmes which yield a very small penalty recovery. Indeed,
since private enforcers’ proﬂts depend on successful crime detection, one cannot ex-
pect them to produce high levels of deterrence, for this would bring their intakes down
to nought. As it will become clear below, a similar argument applies to gatekeepers.
Under the assumption that their payment cannot be made contingent on the level of
eﬁort exerted in auditing, but just on the results of their activity, gatekeepers can
be given an incentive to perform thorough auditing only when taxpayers are likely
to have misreported. Hence, one cannot have intense auditing and a high level of
compliance at the same time.
It is important to distinguish gatekeeping from another form of third-party in-
volvement in law enforcement, namely \whistle-blowing," which requires third parties
to report to the authorities illegal acts they have knowledge of. While gatekeeping
is based on preventive monitoring (\interdict misconduct"), whistle-blowing is based
on ex-post monitoring (\disclose misconduct"), i.e. on the duty to disclose acts of
misconduct when they have already been perpetrated. Also, whistle-blowing does
not usually require a speciﬂc investigative eﬁort by the third-party.
An important example of gatekeeper liability is that placed on private auditors
by security regulations, which require many transactions to be subject to mandatory
legal opinions. The role of auditors has been subject to a thorough analysis in the
accounting literature, where special attention has been devoted to the ﬂduciary re-
lationship between auditors and shareholders. The focus of this paper is somewhat
diﬁerent, since here auditors are assumed to be subservient to the public rather than
the private interest. Also, in this \public" setting, auditors’ failures to detect individ-
uals’ misreports can be discovered only via costly auditing by the public authority,
while in the \private" setting they result in incorrect decisions on the part of the
3See, for instance, Landes and Posner (1975), Friedman (1984), Polinsky (1980), Melumad and
Mookherjee (1989), and Toma and Toma (1992).
5shareholders, which may eventually lead to unexpected losses. In the latter case,
inaccurate auditing manifests itself with a positive probability even if the \principal"
does not engage in double checking, and standard civil liability may in theory su–ce
to motivate wayward auditors.
Finally, it is important to draw attention to another class of third parties usually
involved in the enforcement of law, namely that of legal advisors. Their role is essen-
tially that of providing the principal actor with information about the relevant laws
and regulations, and the way in which the actor’s behavior can be ﬂtted within the
legal grids. Legal advisors are an important element in the enforcement of complex
matters such as those related to tax, security and environmental regulation. Given
their strong ties with the principal actor and their legal expertise, lawyers and CPAs
are in an ideal position to bear gatekeepers’ responsibilities.4 Legal advising, how-
ever, is not the focus of this paper, and we eschew this issue by assuming that the
taxpayer is perfectly informed about his true tax liability.5
The diﬁerent strands of literature mentioned above provide diﬁerent insights on
the optimal structure of a gatekeepers’ regime. To clear the view from possible
confusion, it may be helpful to review the diﬁerent functions that gatekeepers may
be deemed to serve, sometimes improperly, in the enforcement system.
a: Privatizing enforcement. Since it provides an institutional role to market-
oriented agents, gatekeeping represents a mild form of privatization of the enforcement
system. Privatization, however, is not complete, since the ultimate control remains in
the hands of the public enforcer. Also, gatekeepers are usually not empowered with
the faculty to impose sanctions, since their main objective is \prevention".
b. Providing valuable information. Gatekeepers acquire information on auditees
and convey it to the public authority. In this perspective, the function of gatekeepers
can be assimilated to the sale of a \signal" to the public enforcer. Their involvement
would hence be desirable when the value of the signal exceeded its cost. This view,
however, is over-simplistic as it does not consider the relation between the eﬁort
exerted by independent auditors and the rate of control by the public enforcer, as
well as the market-based relation between individuals and auditors.
4Gatekeeping duties of variable degree are assigned to CPAs and lawyers in nearly all countries.
See E˜ orsi (1975) for a comparative view on vicarious liability, and Developments in the law (1994)
for an examination of the liability of lawyers and CPAs in the US.
5With reference to the US experience, Klepper and Nagin (1989) and Klepper, Mazur and Nagin
(1991) show that tax preparers’ impact on US taxpayers essentially depends on the type of issue
considered: they seem to encourage compliance with regard to unequivocal items and discourage it
with regard to ambiguous ones. On the eﬁect of tax advisors on tax complance see also Scotchmer
(1989) and Reinganum and Wilde (1991).
6c. Shifting the burden of proof. Gatekeeping shifts the burden of proof from the
public authority to individuals, who have to prove (through an auditor’s certiﬂcate)
that they are not liable. Such a device is particularly apt when the \proof" cannot
take the form of (hard) documentary evidence, and hence cannot be directly pro-
duced by individuals. A liability on gatekeepers is imposed so as to discourage the
production of incorrect reports (false evidence).6 The actual cost of the proof (the
audit fee), however, need not necessarily be borne by individuals. Indeed, in welfare-
maximizing tax systems, compliance costs are ultimately borne by the state (which
has to forgo an equivalent amount of tax revenue), whereas noncompliance costs are
borne by individuals.
d. Facilitating self-reporting. Gatekeepers may be deemed to perform the function
of helping individuals learn their actual liability level and behave accordingly. In
other words, they allow individuals to correctly self-report their behavior.7 This
view, however, is misleading, as it mixes the role of gatekeepers with that of expert
advisors. Since the relation between advisors and their clients is one regulated by the
principle of mutual beneﬂt, there is no special reason to subject it to public regulation.
This said, it is clear that expert advising and gatekeeping can be e–ciently performed
by the same party, as an economy of scope is presumably obtained when these tasks
are carried out together.
e. Shifting the responsibility. Since the gatekeeper is collaterally liable for acts
of misconduct by the principal actor, gatekeeping may be viewed as a device apt
to shift the responsibility for law compliance on the party which is more vulnerable
to sanctions (either because it owns greater wealth or because it is more concerned
about reputation eﬁects). Greater vulnerably in turn implies greater deterrence and
higher compliance. We will refer to this argument as the \deep-pockets" theory.8 The
starting point is clearly the principal actor’s asset insu–ciency: the maximal sanc-
tion that he can bear is insu–cient to generate deterrence. Deterrence can then be
increased, leaving the control rate unchanged, by expanding the liability associated
with misconduct to a third party with deep pockets.9 It is important to note, how-
6In a sense, the core problem underlying the literature on independent auditors is just how to
make their reports credible. In the words of Gjesdal (1981): \The fact that hardness is a desirable
characteristic of information systems opens up the question of how information systems which are
not hard may be made hard at a cost."
7Allowing for self-reporting is generally optimal in law enforcement. See Reinganum and Wilde
(1985) and Kaplow and Shavell (1994).
8Apparently, this was one of the arguments for the stringent liability rules (\joint and several")
applicable to accounting ﬂrms in the US up to 1996. In fact, accounting ﬂrms served the role of
\deep-pocket defendants" in civil suits against bankrupt ﬂrms. For an analysis of diﬁerent liability
rules for auditors, see for instance Dye (1993) and Narayan (1994).
9In a sense, this is like requiring gatekeepers to provide primary actors with insurance against
7ever, that liability and decision power do not usually coincide. In fact, the decision
whether or not to abide by the law is not fully delegated to the wealthiest party, nor
is it fully \joint," since gatekeepers cannot usually stop compliance-prone individuals
from abiding by the law. More speciﬂcally, while misconduct is supposed to require
the consent of both parties, the principal actor and the gatekeeper, proper conduct
c a nb ef o r c e db yeither party independently of the other.10
This paper explores the implications of mandatory certiﬂcation in an enforcement
set-up which allows for self-reporting of behavior by individuals. Gatekeepers are
assumed not to possess exclusive legal competence, and they have ex ante less in-
formation than their clients. The primary function of gatekeepers turns out to be
that of providing an obstacle to misconduct: liable taxpayers who try to get away
with their obligation run the risk of being discovered by the gatekeeper and paying
for their failed attempt (wasting money on the audit fee). In this sense, gatekeeping
results in a shift in the burden of \proof" from the state to taxpayers.
There now follows a brief overview of the paper. Section 2 introduces the model
and presents a full characterization of the agents’ equilibrium behavior. In Section
3, the social desirability of the gatekeepers’ system is assessed by comparing it with
direct public enforcement. Section 4 introduces some important extensions, like the
possibility of collusion (4.1), the eﬁect of a tight negligence standard for auditors
(4.2), the desirability of further delegation of the enforcement functions (4.3), and
the eﬁect of cartelization in the audit market (4.4). Section 5 provides a summary
and some ﬂnal remarks.
2 The model
Let us consider the problem related to the enforcement of a particular ﬂscal law,
which states that taxpayers who fulﬂll certain prerequisites are liable the amount T:
The tax law is assumed to be clearly stated, so as not to leave any ambiguity on the
actual criteria for the determination of the liability. In a formal sense, the tax law
is assumed to partition taxpayers’ type space › in two subregions: NL(non liable)
liability in excess of their wealth. For this service, they are paid a premium (the audit fee), which
covers their monitoring costs and expected payments. The speciﬂc feature of gatekeeping, as opposed
to a simple insurance scheme, rests in the gatekeepers’ monitoring vocation: they are capable of,
and have a speciﬂc interest in, screening out individuals who might cause them to incur a sanction,
thereby frustrating attempts to circumvent the law.
10Clearly, this is true when the principal actor is not subjugated by the gatekeeper. The principal
actor has to be protected from the gatekeeper’s malevolent intentions, for example through the right
to appeal directly to the authorities.
8and L (liable). The probability measure of the set NL is assumed to be equal to
p: The dimensions of this space may relate to the characteristics of the taxpayer’s
business, such as its turnover, the number of employees, the production technology,
etc. These characteristics are private information to taxpayers and can be observed
only through a costly audit.11 Taxpayers who claim not to be liable are subject to
mandatory auditing. Independent auditor are therefore the gatekeepers of the tax
law: exemption from the tax can be obtained only through a non-liability certiﬂcate
issued by the auditor. Auditors are hired on the audit market and are paid an audit
fee q: We assume that when an auditor is hired, the taxpayer is committed to accept
her ﬂnal report (hence, the taxpayers cannot switch to a diﬁerent auditor when the
incumbent provides an adverse report). On the other hand, the auditor cannot refuse
to issue a report, and is therefore obliged to provide a conclusive opinion either in
favor of the Liability or the Non Liability of the taxpayer.
In order to ﬂnd out taxpayer’s real type, the auditor can review all taxpayer’s
records and perform on-site investigations. Depending on the level of eﬁort exerted
by the auditor, the audit will achieve diﬁerent levels of accuracy. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume that the auditor either learns the taxpayer’s exact type (an
element in ›) or learns nothing. Let a be the probability that the audit reveals
taxpayer’s true type, and call a the \quality" of the audit. Since the auditing eﬁort
is not observable, its level will be decided by each auditor once her opinion has been
solicited. The audit fee, on the other hand, is ﬂxed before the audit takes place and
is determined on the audit market, where auditing ﬂrms supply their services.
Taxpayers who obtain a Non Liability certiﬂcate are exempted from paying the
tax T, but may be subject to a second audit by the tax agency with probability ﬁ.
If the latter reveals that, contrary to the auditor’s opinion, the taxpayer is actually
liable, both the taxpayer and his auditor are liable for breach of the tax law and are
subject to monetary sanctions F and P; respectively. The auditor is hence subject
to a strict liability standard, under which she is held liable in the event of a failure
to detect a misreport.12
An important assumption is that the auditor cannot deny a non-liability certiﬂcate
when she has found no proofs of the liability of the taxpayer. This implies that she
11In reality, taxpayers themselves may not originally know whether they are liable or not, but can
obtain the relevant information from well informed tax practitioners, whose services can be easily
obtained on the market.
12Although alternative sanction may be available for the punishment of inaccurate auditors, such
as suspension, removal or even imprisonment, a monetary sanction is preferable, since it yields a
direct intake to the state. Nonmonetary sanctions may be possibly imposed on top of the ﬂne. On
the optimal combination of monetary and nonmonetary sanctions, see Polinsky and Shavell (1984).
9cannot \extort" money from non-liable taxpayers by threatening an adverse report.
Such a possibility would be prevented, for instance, by allowing taxpayers to appeal
the report to the tax agency on payment of a small fee. Once the appeal is issued, the
tax agency would perform a new audit on the taxpayer and, assuming that the tax
agency itself does not commit ﬂrst-type errors (false positives), non-liable taxpayers
would be relieved from the tax burden.
The timing of the game is the following:
1. taxpayers get to know their true type,
2. taxpayers formulate their demand for audit certiﬂcates;
3. auditors compete on the audit market and an equilibrium price is achieved;
4. audits are carried out, of the quality decided by individual auditors;
5. taxpayers who fail to get a non-liability certiﬂcate pay the tax T; while the
others are subject to a second audit by the tax agency with probability ﬁ;
6. if the second audit detects a misreport, both the taxpayer and the auditor are
sanctioned.
The game is solved through the Bayes-Nash equilibrium concept. We begin the
analysis by considering the demand side of the market.
2.1 The demand for audits
While taxpayers who are Non Liable will clearly make use of an auditor, taxpayers
who are Liable will do so only if this gives them a good chance to get away with
their tax liability. The audit fee is q; and is ﬂxed by the market. One can conceive
several possible scenarios regarding the way in which this burden is allocated: i) each
taxpayers bears his audit fee, ii) the state refunds the audit fee to all taxpayers,
iii) the state refunds the audit fee to taxpayers who have succeeded in obtaining a
non-liability certiﬂcate.
Among the three possibilities, the most appealing in terms of enforcement e–-
ciency is the third: by making the refund conditional on the outcome of the audit,
it creates a speciﬂc audit cost for liable taxpayers who pretend not to be so. Liable
taxpayers would thus be discouraged from undergoing a costly private audit, and
the scope for self-reporting would be retained. This solution dominates the ﬂrst (in
which self-reporting is preserved but at the expense of an increase in the compliance
costs for non-liable taxpayers) and the second (compliance costs do not increase, but
self-reporting is discouraged).
Let us assume therefore that the audit fee q is refunded by the state whenever the
10auditor’s report is \non-liable". Liable taxpayers will make use of an auditor only if
T‚ a( q+T )+( 1¡a )ﬁF : (1)
By using the auditor, liable taxpayers save on the tax T; but run the risk of being
caught either by the auditor (and pay q + T) or, when this is not the case, by the
tax agency (and pay F). Note that liable taxpayers will surely not demand an audit
when their expected sanction under public enforcement is a su–cient deterrent, i. e.
when ﬁF > T: In the opposite case, they will demand a private audit either if the
audit is of low quality or is relatively cheap.
In order to provide a rationale for the gatekeeping system, we will henceforth
assume that public enforcement is not a su–cient deterrent.
Assumption 1 Insu–cient public deterrence: ﬁF < T:
This assumption implies that taxpayer’s expropriable asset is not large enough to
be e–caciously used as a collateral.
Let ﬂ be the probability that a liable taxpayer decides to apply for a non-liability
certiﬂcate. The demand for private audits will be equal to D (q;a)=p+( 1¡p )ﬂ ,
and will range from p to 1 depending on the magnitude of q and a:
2.2 The equilibrium of the audit market
Let us turn to auditors and their role within the enforcement system. We need to
determine the equilibrium price of the auditors’ services and the optimal investigation
eﬁort that each of them will exert once engaged in auditing. We will develop a model
of competition ￿ a la Bertrand, in which ﬂrms simultaneously decide the price for their
service. Auditing ﬂrms cannot commit themselves ex ante to any level of auditing
eﬁort, since this is not observable. They will therefore choose the eﬁort level (and,
consequently, the audit quality) once they have signed the contract with the taxpayer.
It is assumed that the eﬁort cost S associated with an audit is linear in its quality:
S = sa ;where s is the marginal audit cost.
Let us consider the problem of the auditor. The proﬂt associated with each audit
can be written as
ƒ=q¡ sa¡(1 ¡a )
(1 ¡p )ﬂ
(1 ¡p ) ﬂ+p
ﬁP ;
which includes the audit price q; less the audit cost sa; less the expected penalty
associated with a misreport.
11Diﬁerentiating with respect to the audit quality a yields
ƒ0
a = ¡s+
(1 ¡p ) ﬂ
(1 ¡p )ﬂ+p
ﬁP :
Hence, depending on the probability that the auditee is liable or not, the auditor’s




a⁄(ﬂ)= 0 i f ( 1 ¡p )(ﬁP ¡ s)ﬂ< p s ;
a ⁄ ( ﬂ ) 2[0;1] if (1 ¡p )(ﬁP ¡ s)ﬂ =ps;
a⁄(ﬂ)= 1 i f ( 1 ¡p )(ﬁP ¡ s)ﬂ> p s :
(2)
Note that when the (marginal) audit cost is high, s> (1 ¡p )ﬁP; then the expected
sanction associated with an erroneous certiﬂcation is insu–cient to motivate accurate
auditing, and hence a⁄(ﬂ) = 0 for all ﬂ2[0;1]. In the opposite case, there is a




(i.e. the taxpayer is likely to be non liable), the auditor will elect to devote no eﬁort
to the auditing activity, since the cost of performing an accurate audit outweighs
the expected sanction associated with an inaccurate report. Note, ﬂnally, that the
optimal audit quality does not directly depend on q (if not through ﬂ):
The expected cost of an audit is: sa+( 1¡a ) (1¡p)ﬂ
(1¡p)ﬂ+pﬁP ; and, hence, at the
optimum:
Expected audit cost =
( (1¡p)ﬂ
(1¡p)ﬂ+pﬁP if (1 ¡p )(ﬁP ¡ s)ﬂ< p s ;
s if (1 ¡p )(ﬁP ¡ s)ﬂ> p s :
Since there are no returns from scale associated with the number of audits per-
formed by each individual ﬂrm (each audit is independent of the other) and all ﬂrms
are identical, in equilibrium they will all charge a price q equal to the expected unit
cost of an audit.





(1¡p)ﬂ+pﬁP ; with a = 0 if (1 ¡p )(ﬁP ¡ s)ﬂ< p s ;
q ⁄ =s; with a2[0;1] if (1 ¡p )(ﬁP ¡ s)ﬂ =ps;
q⁄= s; with a = 1 if (1 ¡p )(ﬁP ¡ s)ﬂ> p s
(3)
Given this audit fee, each auditor breaks even and is willing to undertake as many
audits as requested.13
The audit fee q; together with the expected audit quality a;determines the demand
for audits, which, in equilibrium, has be equal to its supply.
By putting together demand and supply, we obtain the equilibrium of the game.
13As in the standard Bertrand setting, the number of ﬂrms operating in equilibrium, as well as
their market shares, is indeterminate.
12Proposition 1
Gatekeeper may play a role in enforcement only if public deterrence is insu–cient
(ﬁ > T
F). If this is the case, the equilibrium of the enforcement game is characterized
as follows:




liable taxpayers demand a private audit, the market audit fee is q⁄= s, and auditors
exert an auditing eﬁort which allows them to detect a misreport with probability a⁄=
T¡ﬁF
T¡ﬁF+s.
2. Auditors are not motivated. If s > ﬁ (1 ¡p ) P, then all liable taxpayers demand
a private audit, ﬂ⁄=1 ; the market audit fee is q⁄=( 1¡p )ﬁP, and auditors exert
no eﬁort in auditing, a⁄=0 :
Proof. If ﬁF > T; then tax agency’s controls are su–cient to deter inaccurate
reporting by the taxpayer. Hence, liable taxpayers will not apply for a certiﬂcation
and auditors will face only non-liable taxpayers. Auditors will therefore issue non-
liability certiﬂcates without exerting any audit eﬁort.
1. If s
(1¡p)P <ﬁ <T
F ; then no-auditing on the side of auditors would induce
all liable taxpayers to apply for a certiﬂcate, ﬂ =1 :But then no-auditing would
not be the best strategy for auditors, since the (marginal) expected sanction due to
inaccurate auditing, (1 ¡p )ﬁP ;would exceed the (marginal) audit cost, s: Hence,
a = 0 cannot occur in equilibrium.Consider now the case with a =1 :Here, audits
are performed with an absolute accuracy and liable taxpayers have no chances of
getting to get away with their tax liability (and audit fee). They will therefore not
apply for a certiﬂcation, ﬂ =0 :Under this condition, however, auditors would know
with certainty that their clients are non-liable and absolute accuracy would not be
the best auditing policy. Hence, a = 1 cannot occur in equilibrium. This proves that,





T¡ﬁF+q⁄: Since competition ￿ a la Bertrand pushes the audit fee down to the
(unit) audit cost, in equilibrium we will have q⁄= (1¡p)ﬂ⁄
(1¡p)ﬂ⁄+pﬁP=s:
2. If ﬁ< s
(1¡p)P and ﬁ< T
F ;then auditors prefer not to engage in costly auditing
even if all liable taxpayers apply for a certiﬂcation with probability one (ﬂ =1 ) :Since
they know that they will not be detected by auditors, liable taxpayers will indeed
apply for a certiﬂcate: The equilibrium audit fee will just cover auditors’ expected
sanction, q⁄=( 1¡p ) ﬁP:
Auditors exert a positive function in the enforcement system only when two con-
ditions are satisﬂed: i) perfect direct enforcement is not viable, ii) the tax agency’s
13control activity is intense enough to motivate a positive auditing eﬁort on the part of
auditors. The second condition implies that private auditing cannot fully substitute
public auditing, since auditors’ services are eﬁective only in the presence of the tax
agency’s stick.
For the purpose of the analysis, we will henceforth concentrate on case 1 of the
proposition, and assume that s
(1¡p)P <ﬁ <T
F : In equilibrium, liable taxpayers apply
for an audit report with probability ﬂ⁄= p
1¡p
s
ﬁP¡s; which increases with the audit cost
s;and decreases with the expected punishment for incorrect reporting, ﬁP:As for the
auditor, the equilibrium audit quality is a⁄= T¡ﬁF
T¡ﬁF+s , which increases with T,a n d
decreases with the audit cost s and the penalty F: Given the probability of liability
of taxpayers applying for an audit and the prospective equilibrium audit eﬁort, the
equilibrium market price for the audit service is equal to the marginal audit cost,
q⁄= s: This is the price which allows the auditing ﬂrm to break even (in expected
terms, and in real terms if it has a large enough number of clients).
We can now turn to the tax agency’s net revenue. We have
R =(1 ¡p )(1¡ﬂ(1 ¡a ))T
| {z }
tax revenue




+( 1¡p )ﬂ(1 ¡a ) ﬁ( P+F )
| {z }
penalty intake
so that, in equilibrium,
R⁄=( 1¡p )T ¡ pcﬁ ¡ ps ¡ (1 ¡p ) ﬂ ⁄ (1 ¡a ⁄ )[ T¡ﬁ( F+P)+cﬁ + s]; (4)
with










Note that the sign of the term within square brackets in eq.(4) depends on the level
of auditors’ liability P. It is negative when P is relatively high: P> T+s
ﬁ +c¡ F: When
the latter inequality is satisﬂed, the net yield associated with auditors’ erroneous
certiﬂcations is positive, and can be used to partially refund the audit fees borne by
non-liable taxpayers.
We can now use the results just obtained to perform some simple comparative
statics.
Let us consider how the net revenue is aﬁected by an increase in the taxpayer’s










> 0 ,P > c :
An increase in the taxpayer’s penalty reduces the auditors’ investigative eﬁort and
increases the net recovery associated with tax agency’s audits. The overall eﬁect on
the net revenue is positive only if the auditor’s liability is greater than tax agency’s
marginal auditing cost. When this condition is not satisﬂed, the reduction in the
screening power of the auditor’s services due to more superﬂcial auditing outweighs
the saving in private audit costs, with the eﬁect of reducing the tax agency’s net
revenue.
Let us consider the eﬁect of a variation in the auditor’s liability. In order to do
so, it is convenient to rewrite the net revenue expression taking into account that
at the (interior) equilibrium ƒ0(a⁄ )=0 ;and thus (1 ¡p ) ﬂ ⁄ ( ﬁP¡s)=ps. Upon
simpliﬂcation, we get
R⁄=( 1¡p )T¡p c ﬁ¡a⁄ ps ¡ (1 ¡p )ﬂ ⁄ (1 ¡a ⁄ )[T¡ﬁF+cﬁ]: (6)















An increase in the auditor’s liability makes misreports more costly: auditors are
willing to invest more in auditing and liable taxpayers reduce their demand for audits.
As a result, correct self-reporting is fostered and the net revenue is increased.
The piece of information just obtained can be used for a simple exercise: suppose
that the joint liability for a misreport is ﬂxed, and that it can be apportioned between






, [T¡ﬁ( F+P)+cﬁ + s] > 0:
Hence, given a ﬂxed joint liability, an increase in the auditor’s liability share
increases the tax agency’s net revenue if and only if the joint liability is
relatively small: P +F< T+s
ﬁ +c:
Let us now consider the eﬁect of a variation in the cost of a private audit. An
increase in s has the following implications: it raises the market price of the audit
services and the number of liable taxpayers demanding an audit service, while it






¡ (1 ¡p )





(T¡ﬁF+s)2 > 0 and @[ﬂ⁄(1¡a⁄ )]
@ s > 0:
This result has the following implication: if diﬁerent groups of taxpayers were
subject to mandatory auditing, the category with the lowest audit cost would be
associated with the smallest audit price, the smallest fraction of misreports and the
largest net revenue.
Finally, it can be shown that while an increase in the tax agency’s audit cost c
clearly reduces the net revenue, variations in the tax agency’s audit rate ﬁ a n di nt h e
tax T have ambiguous eﬁects.
To sum up, we have:
Proposition 2 The net revenue increases with an increase in auditors’ penalty P;
with an increase in taxpayers’ penalty F when P > c; with a reduction in the auditor’s
(marginal) audit cost s; and with a reduction in the tax agency’s marginal audit cost
c:
3 Comparison of regimes
Let us brie￿y compare diﬁerent enforcement regimes. We are interested in estab-
lishing the conditions under which gatekeeping can represent an improvement upon
(imperfect) public enforcement. It is clear from Proposition 1 that if the tax agency’s
control rate were so large as to fully deter evasion (ﬁ> T
F ) or so low as not to moti-
vate auditors (ﬁ< s
(1¡p)P), then gatekeeping would be useless. We consider therefore
the intermediate case in which tax agency’s control rate lies between s
(1¡p)P and T
F:
Social welfare is calculated in a simple utilitarian way by adding the expected
costs and beneﬂts accruing to all players, where the expected loss of liable taxpayers
is scaled down by a factor ‚< 1 ;so as to provide a rationale for the tax system.
In the gatekeepers regime, social welfare amounts to
WG = ¡‚(1 ¡p ) T+R ⁄ =
(1 ¡p ) T (1 ¡‚ )¡p c ﬁ¡a ⁄ ps ¡ (1 ¡p ) ﬂ ⁄ (1 ¡a ⁄ )[ T¡ﬁF+cﬁ]:
In the absence of a market for audit certiﬂcates, pure public enforcement yields:
RP =( 1¡p ) ﬁF ¡ cﬁ
Social welfare is therefore
WP =( 1¡p ) ﬁF (1 ¡‚ )¡c ﬁ :
16Hence, upon simpliﬂcation,
WG¡W P =( 1¡p )[1¡ﬂ(1 ¡a ⁄ )](T¡ﬁF)¡‚(1 ¡p )[T¡ﬁF]
+(1¡p )[1¡ﬂ(1 ¡a ⁄ )]cﬁ ¡ a⁄ ps:
The introduction of mandatory gatekeeping aﬁects social welfare through the follow-
ing eﬁects: a) tax evasion is reduced, b) liable taxpayers lose their evasion rent, c)
gatekeepers’ screening services reduce tax agency’s enforcement cost, and d) addi-
tional audit costs are borne by the private sector.
It cannot be said a priori whether the introduction of gatekeepers increases or
reduces social welfare. This will depend, in general, on the conﬂguration of the
enforcement parameters, and in particular on the level of private audit cost and














Hence, the introduction of gatekeeping is more likely to increase social welfare when
the private audit cost is smaller and auditors’ liability is higher.
If we consider the limit case in which the private audit cost is close to nought,




=( 1¡p )(T¡ﬁF)[1¡‚ ]+( 1¡p ) cﬁ > 0;
since lims! 0ﬂ⁄=0 ;lims! 0a⁄=1 ;and lims! 0q⁄=0 :
On the other hand, if auditors were inﬂnitely liable, we would have limP! 1 ﬂ ⁄=0 ,
limP! 1 a⁄= T¡ﬁF





=( 1¡p )(T¡ﬁF)[1¡‚ ]+( 1¡p ) cﬁ ¡ a⁄ ps;
which cannot be unambiguously signed. The introduction of gatekeepers with inﬂnite
liability is desirable if and if only the gains associated with the reduced evasion and
the screening of taxpayers outweigh the cost of private auditing.
To sum up:
Proposition 3 If s
(1¡p)P <ﬁ <T
F ; the introduction of mandatory gatekeeping is
socially desirable if and only if the following inequality is satisﬂed











a⁄ps: | {z }
private auditcost
17Gatekeeping is more likelyto be sociallydesirable when the private auditcostis smaller
and the auditors’ liability is higher. If private auditcost is negligible, s ! 0; gatekeep-
ing is deﬂnitely desirable. If the auditors’ liability is extended to inﬂnity, P ! 1 ;
gatekeeping is desirable if and only if
(1 ¡p )(T¡ﬁF)[1¡‚ ]+( 1¡p )cﬁ ‚ a⁄ ps:
This result shows that the desirability of a gatekeeping system depends on many
factors. In particular, successful gatekeeping seem to be associated with: 1) the
inability of the public enforcer to produce su–cient deterrence, 2) a high liability
for inaccurate auditing, and 3) a low private audit cost. In the appendix, we check
whether conditions 2 and 3 retain their force when the public enforcer is able to
produce full deterrence (ﬁ can be suitably adjusted). We show that when s tends to
nought, the tax agency can indeed achieve the ﬂrst best (collecting taxes due at no
cost). On the other hand, when the auditor’s liability is stretched to inﬂnity (and
auditors’ reports are turned into \hard evidence"), gatekeeping is desirable only if the
\cost to sanction" ratio is smaller under private rather than public auditing (which
can occur only if private auditors are relatively more e–cient in auditing, s< c ) :
This result seem to endorse the view that the real strength of a gatekeeping system
lies in the informational advantages of gatekeepers rather than in the extension of
the compounded liability for misconduct (deep-pockets theory).
4E x t e n s i o n s
In the following sections, we extend the basic model so as to take into account
the eﬁects of: a) the possibility of collusion between auditors and taxpayers, b)a
tighter liability rule for auditors, c) further delegation of enforcement powers, and d)
cartelization of the audit market.
4.1 Collusion
The fact that the relationship between auditors and taxpayers is mediated by the
market does not preclude the possibility of collusive agreements between the two
parties. Indeed, auditors may ﬂnd it proﬂtable to sell non-liability certiﬂcations
on the spot, without bothering to investigate the taxpayer’s real type. Also, after
discovering one taxpayer’s true liability, auditors may accept a bribe in exchange for
a cover-up.14
14The problem of collusion between auditors and auditees has been examined, among others, by
Baiman, Evans and Nagarajan (1991), Tirole (1992), and Kofman and Lawarre (1993).
18In the simple model outlined in this paper, collusion can be prevented by an
appropriate speciﬂcation of the liabilities of the taxpayer and the auditor. In essence,
joint liability has to be set to such a high level as to make side-dealing unproﬂtable.
Consider ﬂrst the possibility of ex-ante collusion. The price bof a \spot" liability
certiﬂcate cannot be less than the expected penalty for the auditor: b‚ ﬁP:Collusion
can then be prevented by setting P and F so high as to make the expected payment
for the taxpayer with collusion greater than the expected payment without collusion:
(b¡ q+ﬁF) > (1 ¡a ) ﬁF +a(T+q): Since in equilibrium, q = s and (1 ¡a )ﬁF +
a(T+q)=T; the previous inequality reduces to (b¡ s +ﬁF) >T ; which is surely
satisﬂed when ﬁP + ﬁF > T +s; i.e. when the joint cost of collusion exceeds the
joint gain.15
For the case of ex-post collusion, the bribe for an auditor who has detected a
misreport cannot again be less that ﬁP: Also, the expected payment for the taxpayer
is b¡ q+ﬁF if he colludes, and T if he does not. Hence, the collusion-proof liability
level is the same as before.
Proposition 4 Collusion between the taxpayer and the auditor is prevented when
their joint liability is su–ciently high: P +F> T+s
ﬁ :
4.2 Strict liability versus negligence
In this section we consider the somehow less realistic case in which the auditor’s
investigation procedure is perfectly revealed by the tax agency’s audit. In other words,
by spending some resources, the tax agency can observe ex-post whether the auditor
has exerted eﬁort in auditing, and can sanction it for inaccurate auditing even if the
audit outcome is correct (the taxpayer is really non-liable). In practice, this means
that the auditing procedure can be broken down into a certain number of steps, which
allow the auditor to determine without uncertainty the characteristics of the taxpayer.
These steps are essentially those which characterize the procedure followed by the tax
agency or the courts, and which deﬂne the legal \truth" about individual situations.
In this setting, the auditor’s report to the tax agency is not restricted to the Liable
- Non liable alternatives, but involves all numerable characteristics of the taxpayers
that deﬂne his type. The agency’s audit reveals whether these characteristics are
correctly assessed, i.e. whether \due care" has been exerted in auditing.16
15To be certain, this proves that the equilibrium identiﬂed in section 2 remains such even when
the possibility of collusion is taken into consideration. We have not proved that other (collusive)
equilibria cannot emerge.
16The analysis can be easily extended to the case in which \due care" is deﬂned by Generally
Accepted Accounting Standards that leave a margin of uncertainty in the determination of taxpayers’
19The standardized auditing procedure imposes a (possibly high) cost s on the
auditor; which may discourage accurate auditing. We will assume, again, that the
tax agency plays the role of the watchdog, performing random controls on certiﬂed
taxpayers.
Let us consider the auditors’ optimal decision in the new set-up. Let a be the
probability that the auditor follows the standardized procedure. The probability
that the taxpayer’s type is discovered is hence equal to a: With probability 1¡athe
auditor discovers nothing and makes her report up (by picking at random a type in
the non-liability region).
The net proﬂt of the auditor is deﬂned as
ƒN = q¡ sa¡(1 ¡a )ﬁP; (8)
where qrepresents the market audit fee, sathe expected audit cost and (1 ¡a ) ﬁP the
expected sanction following a failure to discover the truth. Contrary to the expression
of Section 2, here the expected sanction is not scaled down by the probability that the
taxpayer is actually liable: whatever the taxpayer’s true liability level, the auditors
can be sanctioned for negligent auditing.





N =0 i f ﬁP < s;
a⁄
N 2 [0;1] if ﬁP = s;
a⁄
N =1 i f ﬁP > s:
The auditor’s decision is eﬁectively decoupled from that of the taxpayer. It depends
only on the prospective punishment threatened by the tax agency in case of negligent
auditing.




q¡ ﬁP if ﬁP • s;
q¡ s if ﬁP > s:
In view of the price competition between auditors, the equilibrium level of the audit




ﬁP if ﬁP • s;
s if ﬁP > s:
We can now turn to taxpayers. Since liable taxpayers elect to demand a certiﬂcation





N =0 i f ﬁP < s;
ﬂ⁄
N 2 [0;1] if ﬁP = s;
ﬂ⁄
N =1 i f ﬁP > s:
true characteristics.
20It can be seen, therefore, that the enforcement outcome depends ultimately on the
level of the expected punishment for negligent auditing by the auditor.
For ﬁP > s (negligent auditing is deterred), the net revenue to the tax agency is
R⁄
N=( 1¡p ) T¡p s¡p c ﬁ: (9)
With a negligent liability standard, auditors are more easily motivated to perform a
thorough audit, since correct reporting by the taxpayer cannot be an excuse for their
inaccurate auditing. Hence, they cannot rely on their equilibrium beliefs to ﬂll in
their report.
If we compare the net revenues obtained under strict liability and negligence
standard (eq.(4) and (9), respectively), we get
R⁄




that is, a tight negligence standard is desirable only if the auditor’s and taxpayer’s
joint liability is relatively small.
To sum up:
Proposition 5 Auditors’ liability standard. Assume that the auditors’ message space
is wider than that of the taxpayer and that auditors’ liability concerns the respect
of proper auditing standards rather than correct certiﬂcation (the auditor is subject
to a tight negligence standard). Then, if the auditor’s liability is su–ciently high,
P> s = ﬁ; the auditors perform accurate auditing, a⁄=1 ; liable taxpayers do not
demand a non-liability certiﬂcate, ﬂ⁄=1 ; and the audit fee is ﬂxed at q⁄= s:
A tight negligence standard is preferable to a strict liability standard only when
the joint liability is relatively small: P +F< T+s
ﬁ + c:
Under a tight negligence standard, the risk of a sanction for inaccurate auditing
is increased, and auditors are lead to provide high quality audits. Auditors’ accurate
screening services, however, are costly: no sanctions are ever collected on auditors,
and liable taxpayers do not contribute to the refunding of the audit expenses of the
non-liable ones. Whether such a high auditing eﬁort is actually desirable depends on
the accuracy reached under the strict liability standard: when the joint liability is
high, liable taxpayers are motivated to self-report correctly and auditors have enough
incentives to perform audits of good quality even if they are not subject to a tight
negligence rule. Hence, there is no need to force auditors to further increase the
quality - and cost - of their audits.
214.3 Gatekeeping versus full delegation
In a gatekeepers’ regime, third-party enforcement aims at preventing misconduct by
agents subject to a speciﬂc law. Third party enforcement, however, can take even
stronger forms, in which the third party is empowered with the faculty to enforce
the law and impose sanctions on noncompliant agents. In this section, we enhance
the auditors’ position in the enforcement system by making misreports to the auditor
unlawful, and hence punishable. We model this possibility by assuming that liable
taxpayers detected by the auditor have to pay, on top of q+ T; an extra penalty …;
which is collected by the tax agency. When the total payment q+T +… reaches the
maximal penalty F; enforcement is de facto delegated to auditors, who are in charge
of detecting acts of misconduct (lying to the auditor is equivalent to lying to the tax
agency) and reporting them to the authority.
Apart from this, the structure of the game remains unaltered: taxpayers demand
audits on the audit market, auditors compete ￿ a la Bertrand, and misreports detected
by the tax agency lead to a sanction of both the taxpayer and the auditor.17
In the (interior) equilibrium, the demand for audits by liable taxpayers and the






The imposition of a penalty on taxpayers who misreport to their auditor allows the
latter to reduce their investigative eﬁort. The net revenue to the tax agency is now
R… =( 1¡p )T¡pcﬁ¡ps¡(1 ¡p )ﬂ ⁄ (1 ¡a ⁄
… )[ T¡ﬁ( F+P)+cﬁ + s]+(1 ¡p )ﬂ ⁄ a ⁄
… …:
Through algebraic manipulation it can be shown that
R… >R ⁄ () ¡[ a ⁄ ¡a ⁄
… ][T¡ﬁ( F+P)+cﬁ + s] ¡… a ⁄
…> 0
() P>c :
Hence, the additional sanction … increases the tax agency’s net revenue only if the
auditors’ liability is su–ciently high. Since in the new equilibrium both the taxpay-
ers’ expected payments and auditors’ net proﬂts are unaltered, variations in the net
revenue translate directly into variations in social welfare. This allows us to conclude
as follows.
17It may seem odd that taxpayers are requested to pay for an auditing service that is apparently
not to their advantage. This, however, is only due to an accounting convention: taxpayers who
obtain a non-liability certiﬂcate have their audit fees refunded, while the others pay a sanction
which is net of the fee. It is the tax agency which ultimately bears the cost of private enforcement.
22Proposition 6 Full delegation. The introduction of a sanction for taxpayers who
misreport to their auditor is socially desirable if and only if auditors’ liability exceeds
the public audit cost: P > c:
This results shows that the reduction in private auditing eﬁort is socially desirable
only if the net yield of public audits from (undetected) liable taxpayers is su–ciently
large. Under this condition, which also guarantees that @ R
@ F > 0, it is desirable to
increase taxpayers’ incentives to correctly self-report, so as to minimize the amount
of social resources devoted to auditing.
4.4 Cartelization in the audit market
A particular di–culty which an e–cient gatekeeping system may have to surmount
is represented by gatekeepers’ tendency to group in professional associations and
create market barriers. This tendency may result in the creation of a gatekeepers’
\cartel," able to exercise monopoly power on the audit market. This possibility is
clearly deleterious for the enforcement system, and can make gatekeeping deﬂnitely
undesirable.
In order to provide a formal foundation to the previous argument, let us consider
the optimal pricing policy for monopolistic gatekeepers. In the move sequence, the
gatekeepers’ association is now assigned the ﬂrst move (set the audit fee). Apart from
this, the move order is the same as before.





(1 ¡p )ﬂ ⁄
C




C are determined in the continuation equilibrium. For the same
arguments given in Section 2, it can be seen that in the continuation equilibrium both
taxpayers and auditors will play mixed strategies (assuming that s
(1¡p)P <ﬁ <T
F ) :




ﬁP¡s (as before) and a⁄
C = T¡ﬁF
T¡ﬁF+q: The equilibrium
audit quality is hence decreasing in q:











since in equilibrium @ ƒ
@ a⁄= 0. Ergo, gatekeepers have an incentive to set the audit
fee as high as possible, q⁄!1 ; thereby pushing the equilibrium audit quality to
nought. Under these conditions gatekeeping would be deﬂnitely detrimental, as it
would just provide gatekeepers with a position rent.
23In an attempt to restrain gatekeepers’ monopolistic ambitions, a price-cap on the
audit fee may be imposed. As expected, the net revenue to the tax agency is larger
if the cap is smaller. Depending on the level of this cap (as well as on the weight
attached to auditors’ proﬂts in the social welfare function), gatekeeping may or may
not be socially desirable.
5 Final remarks
The model developed in this paper sheds some light on the implications of gatekeeping
on the behavior of the agents and the enforcement of law. Despite its simplicity, the
model provides clear-cut criteria for the assessment of gatekeeping systems, and a
rationale for some of those already in place. Gatekeeping turns out to play a role in
enforcement only if public enforcement is insu–cient, but not immaterial, as otherwise
gatekeepers would not be induced to perform accurate audits. Under this condition,
gatekeeping is proved to be socially desirable only if the private audit cost is smaller
that the public one and auditors’ liability is su–ciently high.
The basic model is helpful in shedding light on some important issues related
the optimal enforcement system. In particular, we have shown that, when the joint
liability of the auditor and the taxpayer is su–ciently high, collusion between them
should not represent a threat to the proper functioning of the gatekeeping system
and that a strict negligence standard (whereby auditors are liable whenever their
report is incorrect) should yield the best outcome. Also, we have proved that further
delegation of the enforcement powers to private auditors would be desirable, provided
that the gatekeepers’ liability is su–ciently high. Finally, we have identiﬂed what is
likely to represent the major threat to a gatekeeping system, namely the possible
cartelization of the gatekeepers’ market, which would deﬂnitely call for some form of
public regulation.
Our analysis can be extended in several ways. First, it may be interesting to
consider the possibility that auditors’ reports address both by the public enforcer
and a private \principal" (e.g. the capital market), who is also interested in knowing
the agent’s true characteristics. Indeed, in many settings, the information upon which
the tax liability is deﬂned aﬁects other important aspects of an agent’s activity, like
its solvency and proﬂtability. It is not clear, at this stage, how the introduction of
this common agency problem would aﬁect our results.
Second, we have only mentioned the possibility that the gatekeeping duty is as-
signed to taxpayers’ legal advisors, who usually have a good knowledge of taxpayers’
real situation. Bundling legal counseling and gatekeeping together, as it often occurs
24in real practice, may be an eﬁective tool to reduce the gatekeeping costs (thanks to an
economy of scope), but may also have negative consequences on the ﬂduciary relation
between advisors and their clients. Given its relevance in real gatekeeping systems,
this issue probably deserves a more accurate investigation.
256 Appendix
One may wonder how the desirability of a gatekeeping regime relates to the assump-
tion that direct public enforcement is unable to produce deterrence, i.e. that ﬁ is
bounded above. In this appendix, we consider the case in which the tax agency can
suitably adjust the control rate ﬁ; and derive the enforcement outcome for the limit
cases in which s! 0 and P! 1:
Suppose that ﬁ can be set to any level. Under the (reasonable) assumption that
(1 ¡p ) F>p c ;the optimal control policy under direct public enforcement is ﬁ =
lim† !0 T
F + † ;which yields R =( 1¡p ) T¡p cT
F :
Consider now the optimal gatekeeping policy. Let s! 0 :Since lims! 0 @ R⁄
@ ﬁ =
¡pc < 0; the tax agency will optimally set ﬁ! 0 and net: lims! 0R⁄=( 1¡p )T:
Hence, the ﬂrst best is achieved: audit costs are reduced to nought and taxes are
collected in full. The possibility of involving an informed third party in the
enforcement system allows the agency to overcome its limited information
and to avoid wasting any resources in costly auditing.
Suppose now that auditors are assigned an inﬂnite liability. Under this condition,
auditors reports become indeed \hard evidence". Since lims! 0 @ R⁄
@ ﬁ is negative, the
tax agency will set ﬁ! 0 and obtain (see eq.4) limP! 1 R⁄=( 1¡p )T¡p s T
T+s : In
equilibrium, therefore, some resources are still spent in auditing and the ﬂrst best is
not achieved. If we compare this expression with the outcome associated with optimal








which says that the comparison between the two enforcement system depends on the
relative levels of the \cost-sanction ratio," i.e. the ratio between the audit cost
(s and c; respectively) and the \sanction" to taxpayers following an adverse audit
outcome (T+s and F; respectively). Since T+s• Fby the limited liability of tax-
payers (the optimal ﬂne expropriates the taxpayers of his entire asset), it follows that:
Even when the auditor’s liability is stretched to inﬂnity (auditor’s reports
are \hard evidence"), gatekeeping is desirable only if private auditors are
more e–cient in auditing: s < c:18
18It can be shown that the same result obtains when auditors are protected by limited liability
(P< 1 ) and are oﬁered an inﬂnite reward for each case of misreporting detected.
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